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 1 Introduction
Are foreign exchange interventions e⁄ective? This issue has been debated extensively in
the 1980s and 1990s, but no conclusive consensus has emerged.1 A key di¢ culty faced by
researchers in answering this question is the endogeneity problem: the exchange rate responds
￿within the period￿to foreign exchange interventions and the monetary authorities react
￿within the period￿to ￿ uctuations in the exchange rate.2 As an example, consider the case
of Japan.3 The monetary authorities of Japan, which are known to be one of the most
active interveners, started to disclose intervention data in July 2001, and this has rekindled
researchers￿interest in the e⁄ectiveness of interventions.4 However, the information disclosed
is limited: only the total amount of interventions on a day is released to the public at the
end of a quarter, and no detailed information, such as on the time of the intervention(s),
the number of interventions over the course of the day, and the market(s) (Tokyo, London,
or New York) in which the intervention(s) were executed, is disclosed.5 Most importantly,
the low frequency of the disclosed data poses a serious problem for researchers because it is
well known that the Japanese monetary authorities often react to intraday ￿ uctuations in
the exchange rate.6
In this paper, we propose a new methodology, which is based on Gibbs sampling, to
1See Edison (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), and Sarno and Taylor (2003) for surveys.
2Note that this di¢ culty would not arise if the monetary authorities responded only slowly to ￿ uctuations
in the exchange rate, or if the data sampling interval were su¢ ciently ￿ne. In the context of ￿scal policy,
for example, the government reacts to changes in variables like output and employment only slowly due to
the political processes involved, so that researchers can identify the impact of ￿scal policy on these variables
using available quarterly data. Blanchard and Perotti (1999) used this property together with other detailed
information on ￿scal institutions in identifying their structural VAR model.
3The intervention decision in Japan is under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Japan acts as an agent for implementation. See Ito (2003) for details of institutional aspects.
4Recent studies re￿ ecting this renewed interest includes Ito (2003), Fatum and Hutchison (2006),
Dominguez (2003), Chaboud and Humpage (2005), Galati et al (2005), Fratzscher (2005), Watanabe and
Harada (2006), and Fatum (2008), among others.
5This is true for monetary authorities in most industrial countries. For example, the Bundesbank and
other euro-zone central banks do not disclose intervention data to the public; neither does the European
Central Bank. The monetary authorities of the UK started to disclose information about their interventions
in 2000, but the only information disclosed is the daily amount of interventions. An important exception
is the Swiss National Bank (SNB), which discloses all transactions it carried out in the Swiss franc/US
dollar market. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and Vitale (2003) use the SNB transactions data to
evaluate the e¢ cacy of interventions.
6Chang and Taylor (1998), for example, counting the number of reports by Reuters about Japanese
central bank interventions from October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993, ￿nd that there were reports of 154
intervention in 69 days, implying that the Japanese central bank intervenes, on average, two or three times
a day.
1eliminate the endogeneity problem caused by the fact that data on foreign exchange market
interventions is available only on an aggregate daily basis. Consider a simple two-equation
system. Hourly changes in the exchange rate, 4sh, satisfy 4sh = ￿Ih+disturbance, where Ih
is the hourly amount of yen-buying interventions. On the other hand, the reaction function
of the monetary authorities is given by Ih = ￿4sh￿1 + disturbance. Suppose that this
two-equation system represents the true structure of the economy, and that sh is observable
at the hourly frequency but Ih is not: researchers are able to observe only the daily sum
of Ih, and in that sense, intervention data su⁄ers from temporal aggregation. Given this
environment, our task is to estimate ￿ and ￿.
The key idea of methodology we propose is as follows. Suppose we have a guess about
the values of ￿ and ￿. Then the exchange rate equation and the policy reaction function
allow us to recover the hourly amount of intervention, subject to the constraint that the
sum of hourly amounts equals the daily amount, which is observable. In an extreme case in
which the variance of the disturbance term in the ￿rst equation is very small, we estimate
Ih as Ih = ￿￿14sh using the ￿rst equation. In the other extreme case in which the variance
of the disturbance term in the second equation is tiny, then we have Ih = ￿4sh￿1 from the
second equation. In more general cases, one can guess (and we will verify this later) that
the estimate of Ih is a weighted average of the two, with the weights being determined by
the relative importance of the two disturbance terms. Once we obtain an estimate for the
hourly amount of intervention in this way, we can estimate ￿ and ￿ without encountering
an endogeneity problem. By repeating this procedure, we are able to estimate the two
parameters as well as the hourly amount of intervention.
More precisely, we are able to obtain the distributions of ￿ and ￿, given the hourly
amount of intervention and the hourly exchange rate. At the same time, given the two
parameters, the hourly exchange rate, and the daily amount of intervention, we are able to
obtain the distribution of the hourly amount of intervention. Combining these two condi-
tional distributions, we are able to obtain the joint and marginal distributions of the two
parameters as well as the hourly amount of intervention through Gibbs sampling.
Our method can be seen as an application of ￿imputation￿ or ￿data augmentation￿
techniques based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations to the endogeneity
problem. The idea of applying MCMC methods to data augmentation was ￿rst proposed
by Tanner and Wong (1987). Similar MCMC methods were used by Pedersen (1995) and
Eraker (2001), among others, in the context of estimating parameters in continuous di⁄usion
processes when only discrete, and sometimes low-frequency, data are available. However, to
2the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst attempt to make use of MCMC methods to
solve the endogeneity problem. Note that the endogeneity problem we discuss in this paper
occurs simply because the frequency of intervention data is not su¢ ciently high. In this
sense, our paper deals with the issue of estimation biases caused by ￿temporal aggregation,￿
which has been discussed by Sims (1971), Chow and Lin (1971), Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1987), and McCrorie and Chambers (2006), among others, in a closely-related but di⁄erent
context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed ex-
planation of our methodology to address the endogeneity problem, while Section 3 presents
simulation results to demonstrate how the methodology works. In Section 4, we apply our
methodology to Japanese data. We ￿nd that an exchange rate intervention (e.g., a sale) of
one trillion yen leads to 1.7 percent change in the value of the yen (depreciation): this is more
than twice as large as the magnitude reported in previous studies such as Ito (2003) and
Fratzscher (2005), which apply ordinary least squares to daily intervention and exchange rate
data. This result is consistent with the prediction that endogeneity creates a bias toward zero
for the intervention coe¢ cient, as long as the monetary authorities follow a leaning-against-
the-wind policy. It also shows the quantitative importance of the endogeneity problem due
to temporal aggregation. Section 5 concludes the paper, while the Appendix provides the
technical details of our methodology.
2 Methodology
2.1 The endogeneity problem in identifying the e⁄ects of foreign exchange
interventions
In this section, we present a detailed description of our methodology to address the endo-
geneity problem in identifying the e⁄ects of foreign exchange interventions on the exchange
rate. Consider a simple model of the following form:
st;h ￿ st;h￿1 = ￿It;h + ￿t;h (1)
It;h = ￿(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1) + ￿t;h (2)
where st;h is the log of the yen/dollar rate at hour h of day t (t = 1;:::;T and h = 1;:::;24),
It;h is the purchase of yen (and the selling of US dollars) implemented by the Japanese central
bank between h ￿ 1 and h of day t, ￿t;h s i:i:d:N(0;￿2
￿), and ￿t;h s i:i:d:N(0;￿2
￿). Equation
(1) represents the exchange rate dynamics, while equation (2) is the central bank￿ s policy
3reaction function. We assume that ￿ is negative, implying that yen-selling interventions
(It;h < 0) lead to a depreciation of the yen (st;h ￿ st;h￿1 > 0) and vice versa. We also
assume that the exchange rate is observable at the hourly frequency, while interventions are
observable only at the daily frequency: namely, we observe It ￿ ￿24
h=1It;h. Note that if we
were able to observe It;h at the hourly frequency, we could obtain unbiased estimators of ￿
and ￿ by applying OLS to each of the two equations separately.
Taking partial sums of both sides of the equations leads to a daily model of the following
form:




(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1) + ￿t (4)
where st;24 ￿ st￿1;24 =
P24
h=1(st;h ￿ st;h￿1), It =
P24
h=1 It;h, ￿t ￿ ￿24
h=1￿t;h, and ￿t ￿ ￿24
h=1￿t;h.
This shows that the endogeneity problem arises in this daily model, so that a simple appli-
cation of OLS to each of the two equations separately no longer works. To illustrate this,
suppose that the central bank adopts a leaning-against-the-wind policy, so that ￿ takes a
positive value. Then an increase in ￿t;h leads to an increase in st;h ￿ st;h￿1 through equation
(1), and to an increase in It;h+1 through equation (2). This means that It and ￿t in equation
(3) are positively correlated, so that an OLS estimator of ￿ has an upward bias. On the other
hand, an increase in ￿t;h increases It;h through equation (2), thereby creating an appreciation
of the yen as long as ￿ is negative. This implies that the error term in equation (4), ￿t, and
the regressor,
P
(st;h ￿ st;h￿1), are negatively correlated and, as a result, an OLS estimate
of ￿ has a downward bias.
2.2 MCMC simulations
We propose a method for estimating equations (1) and (2) using the daily data for inter-
ventions and the hourly data for the exchange rate. The set of parameters to be estimated
is ￿, ￿, ￿2
￿, and ￿2
￿. We ￿rst introduce an auxiliary variable, It;h, to substitute missing
observations. Then we obtain a conditional distribution of each parameter, given the other
parameters and the values of the auxiliary variable. Similarly, we obtain a conditional dis-
tribution of the auxiliary variable, given the parameters. Finally, we use the Gibbs sampler
to approximate joint and marginal distributions of the entire parameters and the auxiliary
variable from these conditional distributions.7
7See Kim and Nelson (1999) for more on Gibbs sampling.
42.2.1 Prior distributions
We choose the following priors for the unknown parameters. We adopt a ￿ at prior for ￿ and
￿. On the other hand, we assume that the priors for ￿2
￿ and ￿2
￿, are more informative than











with ￿1 = 10 and ￿1 = 0:001, implying that the mean of ￿￿ is 0:011 and that the 95 percent
con￿dence interval is 0:007 to 0:018. The prior of ￿2









with ￿ = 10 and ￿ = 0:1, implying that the mean of ￿￿ is 0:118 and that the 95 percent
con￿dence interval is 0:071 to 0:176.
2.2.2 Computational algorithm
The above assumptions about the priors and the data generating process, which is given by
equations (1) and (2), provide us with posterior conditional distributions that are needed to
implement Gibbs sampling. The following steps 1 through 5 are iterated to obtain the joint
and marginal distributions of the parameters and the auxiliary variables. The summations
are taken from (t;h) = (1;1) to (T;24), unless otherwise stated.
Step 1 Generate ￿ conditional on st;h, It;h, and ￿2
￿. We have the regression st;h ￿ st;h￿1 =











Step 2 Generate ￿2








￿s = ￿1 + T and ￿s = ￿1 + RSSs with RSSs =
P
(st;h ￿ st;h￿1 ￿ ￿It;h)2.
Step 3 Generate ￿ conditional on st;h, It;h, and ￿2
￿. We have the regression It;h = ￿(st;h￿1￿








Step 4 Generate ￿2








where ￿I = ￿2 + T and ￿I = ￿2 + RSSI with RSSI =
P
(It;h ￿ ￿(st;h￿1 ￿
st￿1;h￿1))2.
5Step 5 Generate It;h conditional on st;h, It, ￿, ￿, ￿2
￿, and ￿2
￿. Consider the case in which





where ￿t = (￿t;1;:::;￿t;24)0 and ￿ = diag(’;:::;’) with ￿t;h = 1
￿2
￿￿(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1) +
￿2
￿2




￿)￿1. We consider the posterior distribution of
(It;1;:::;It;23;It). Notice that when we know (It;1;:::;It;23;It), the intervention in the
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0 1 ::: 0
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We can partition the matrices ￿￿






















t;1 is 23 ￿ 1, ￿￿
t;2 is 1 ￿ 1, ￿￿
11 is 23 ￿ 23, ￿￿
12 is 1 ￿ 1, ￿￿
21 is 1 ￿ 1, and ￿￿
22 is
1￿1. Finally, we can construct the posterior distribution of (It;1;:::;It;23) conditional


























By generating the auxiliary variables It;1;:::;It;23 from this posterior distribution con-
ditional on the parameters, the hourly exchange rate, and the aggregated intervention,
we can construct the intervention in the last hour as It;24 = It ￿ ￿23
h=1It;h.
We iterate steps 1 through 5 M + N times and discard the realizations of the ￿rst
M iterations but keep the last N iterations to form a random sample of size N on which
statistical inference can be made. M must be su¢ ciently large so that the Gibbs sampler
converges. Also, N must be large enough to obtain the precise empirical distribution. In our
simulations, we set M = 2000 and N = 2000 and run 3 independent Markov chains.
63 Simulation Analysis
In this section we conduct Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance of our
methodology. We start by assuming that the data generating process is given by equations
(1) and (2) with s0;24 = ln(100), ￿ = ￿0:015, ￿ = 3:2, ￿￿ = 0:01, and ￿￿ = 0:1. We borrow
the estimates of ￿ and ￿ from Kearns and Rigobon (2005):8 ￿ = ￿0:015 implies that a 1
trillion yen intervention by the Japanese monetary authorities moves the yen/dollar rate by
1.5 percent; on the other hand, ￿ = 3:2 implies that a one percent deviation of the exchange
rate from its target level causes the Japanese monetary authorities to intervene with 32
billion yen.
We generate bivariate time series fst;h;It;hg by (1) and (2). The length of the time series
is set at 100 days (T=100), and 500 replications of this length are generated. We repeat
this for T=250 and 500. We then estimate the unknown parameters under the following
three cases. The ￿rst one is what we refer to as the ￿infeasible estimator.￿ We assume
that the hourly amount of intervention, It;h, is observable to us, and we simply apply OLS
to the hourly data of intervention and exchange rates. This estimator can be seen as the
best one (although it is infeasible), and will be used as a benchmark. The second case we
refer to as the ￿naive OLS estimator,￿where we assume that intervention data is available
only at the daily frequency, and we apply OLS to the daily intervention and exchange rate
data. Speci￿cally, we estimate equations (3) and (4) separately. This estimator su⁄ers from
the endogeneity problem, as explained earlier. The third case we refer to as the ￿MCMC
estimator,￿where we assume that exchange rate data is available at the hourly frequency,
but intervention data is available only at the daily frequency, and we apply our MCMC
method to these data.9
Table 1 presents the simulation results. We evaluate the performance of the three esti-
mators in terms of bias, which is de￿ned to be the average deviation of an estimator from its
true value, as well as the root mean squared error. We can see that the infeasible estimator
is unbiased and precise in the sense that both the bias and the root mean squared error
are small, while the naive OLS estimator performs much worse. The naive OLS estimators
of ￿ and ￿ have upward and downward biases, respectively, and we see no clear tendency
that these biases become smaller with the sample size T. In contrast, the MCMC estimator
8We divide their estimate of ￿ by 24 to convert their estimate, which is based on a daily frequency, to
one based on an hourly frequency.
9The MCMC method provides us with a posterior distribution for each of the parameters. We use the
mean of the distribution as a point estimate.
7performs as well as the infeasible estimator: the bias is almost the same as in the case of the
infeasible estimator; the root mean squared error is slightly larger, but the di⁄erence tends
to become smaller with T increasing.
4 Application to Japanese Data
4.1 Policy reaction function with transaction costs
Figures 1 and 2 show the hourly movement of the yen/dollar rate, and the daily amount
of intervention, both for the period from April 1991 to December 2002.10 In applying our
method to the Japanese data, we modify the model described by equations (1) and (2) in
the following way. Equation (2) implies that interventions are every-day events: namely, the
central bank intervenes (by a small amount) even on ￿quiet￿days when the exchange rate
is fairly stable. But this is not consistent with the fact that interventions were carried out
only on 7 percent of the total business days, that is, 214 out of 3,055 business days, during
the sample period. In this sense, Japanese interventions have an ￿all or nothing￿property,
suggesting that we need to incorporate some form of transaction costs associated with the
conduct of interventions.
Speci￿cally, following Almekinders and Eij¢ nger (1996) and Ito and Yabu (2007), we
assume that the Japanese monetary authorities have to pay some ￿xed costs on intervention
days, in the form of political costs. These political costs may include, for example, the costs
incurred by the Japanese government in conducting negotiation with governments of relevant
countries, as pointed out by Ito and Yabu (2007). The Japanese monetary authorities are
assumed to compare the bene￿ts of intervention (greater stability in the exchange rate)
and the ￿xed costs they have to incur in implementing interventions. As is well known, a
solution to this type of optimization with ￿xed costs is characterized by a state-dependent
rule: namely, the monetary authorities carry out interventions only when the optimal level
of intervention for that day exceeds a threshold. In our baseline regression we use a state-
dependent rule of the form:
It;h = 1(jI
￿





t;h = ￿I + ￿(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1) + ￿It￿1 + ￿t;h (7)
10Our sample period does not include the period of ￿Great Intervention￿in 2003 and 2004, during which the
Japanese monetary authorities aggressively purchased US dollars and sold yen as a part of their ￿quantitative
easing￿policy. Previous studies argue that the central bank￿ s motivation for these interventions was quite
di⁄erent from the one in the preceding period. See Taylor (2006) for more on the intervention policy during
this period.
8Equation (7) describes how the optimal level of intervention, I￿
t;h, is determined, and equation
(6) represents a state-dependent policy reaction function, where 1(￿) represents a zero-one
indicator function. In equation (7), we assume that the optimal level of intervention depends
on the change in the exchange rate over the last 24 hours. We also allow autocorrelation
between intervention today and intervention yesterday so as to capture the tendency for
interventions to be clustered, which was highlighted by Fatum and Hutchison (2003). In
equation (6), we assume that intervention is carried out if the optimal level of intervention
at the beginning of a day, I￿
t;1, exceeds a prespeci￿ed threshold c, which is determined by
the size of the political costs.11 Note that It;h equals I￿
t;h for any h as long as I￿
t;1 exceeds the
threshold. In other words, once the monetary authorities decide to intervene on day t at the
beginning of that day, they are allowed to intervene for every hour of day t without incurring
any extra political costs. In this sense, the monetary authorities￿decision on whether to
intervene or not is made only once a day, although the amount of intervention for every hour
of the day is decided during the daytime depending on ￿ uctuations in the exchange rate over
the course of the day.
4.2 Change in intervention strategy
Figure 2 shows that there is a structural break somewhere around 1995: interventions are
small in size but frequent during the former period, while they are larger in size but less
frequent during the latter period. As mentioned by Ito (2003), among others, this break
corresponds to a replacement of the person in charge of the conduct of interventions in June
1995.12 The number of days when interventions were carried out is 165 out of 1,101 business
days during the period from April 1991 to June 1995, so that the probability of intervention
11As a de￿nition of time, we use the GMT clock. The GMT time relates to business hours of the three
major markets as the following: The Tokyo business hours (9 to 17) correspond to GMT hours 0 to 8, the
London business hours (9 to 17) to GMT hours 9 to 17 during the standard time, and the New York business
hours (9 to 17) to the GMT hours 14 to 22 during the standard time. Hence, the beginning of the day t is
when the Tokyo market opens at the day t. Therefore, the model assumes that the Japanese intervention
decision is made just before the Tokyo market is open. We believe that for informing Ministers this timing
of the day is the best.
12On June 21, 1995, Eisuke Sakakibara was appointed as Direct General of the International Finance
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. Regarding exchange rate interventions, he later wrote: ￿The market was
accustomed to interventions, because they were too frequent. The interventions were taken as given. Most
interventions, including joint interventions, were predictable, so that interventions, even joint ones, had only
small, short-term e⁄ects, and could not change the sentiment of the market.￿(Sakakibara, 2000, p.119) ￿[A]
change in intervention philosophy and technique [was introduced]. For this, all I had to do was to make
a decision and convince the Vice Minister and the Minister of [its desirability]. For one, the frequency of
interventions was reduced substantially, and the per-intervention amount was increased, in order to push up
the level [of the dollar vis-￿-vis the yen]￿(Sakakibara, 2000, p.120).
9was 0.15. In the latter period, the corresponding probability was 0.03 (49 intervention days
out of 1,954 business days). On the other hand, the average yen amount of interventions on
days when such interventions were conducted was 0.05 trillion yen in the former period and
0.52 trillion yen in the latter period. Kearns and Rigobon (2005) make use of this shift in
the Japanese intervention policy as a key piece of information in identifying the e⁄ects of
Japanese intervention on the yen/dollar rate.






t;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c1)I￿
t;h for t < TB
1(jI￿
t;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c2)I￿
t;h for t ￿ TB
(8)
where TB is the break date (namely, June 1995), and c1 and c2 are di⁄erent thresholds for the
two subperiods. Here we assume that the change in the Japanese policy reaction function is
represented solely by a change in threshold c, or the size of political costs, and that the other
parameters are identical across the two subperiods. We make this assumption simply to
obtain empirical results that are comparable to those of Kearns and Rigobon (2005), whose
identi￿cation method requires such an assumption. Note that our identi￿cation method does
not require us to impose this assumption.
4.3 Baseline results
In our baseline regression, we use equations (7) and (8), together with the following equation
describing exchange rate dynamics:
st;h ￿ st;h￿1 = ￿s + ￿It;h + ￿t;h: (9)
Table 2 presents the results. We run regressions with and without the lagged intervention
term It￿1, with the left half of the table showing the result without that term, and the right
half showing that with that term. Details regarding the algorithm used are provided in the
Appendix.13
Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on the intervention variable, ￿, in equation (9) is
negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the sense that the 95 percent posterior
interval does not include zero. Note that the frequency of ￿nding negative values, Pr(< 0),
13We iterate 20,000 times and discard the ￿rst 10,000 realizations (M = 10;000 and N = 10;000). We
run 5 independent Markov chains and report the Gelman-Rubin statistic ^ R to monitor the convergence of
the Markov chains. ^ R < 1:1 is considered as a sign of convergence. See Gelman et al. (2003) for details. We
con￿rm that convergence is accepted in every case.
10equals unity, indicating that we ￿nd not one positive values in 10,000 draws. The estimated
value of ￿ is equal to -0.0174, implying that a yen-selling (yen-buying) intervention of one
trillion yen leads to a 1.74 percent depreciation (appreciation) of the yen. The estimate is
robust to changes in the speci￿cation, i.e., whether a lagged intervention term is included or
not.
Our estimate regarding the impact of foreign exchange interventions is more than twice
as large as that obtained in previous studies. Ito (2003), for example, applying OLS to
daily data of Japanese interventions and the yen/dollar rate, arrived at a corresponding
change of 0.6 percent for the sample period of April 1991 to March 2001 and 0.9 percent
for the subperiod from June 1995 to March 2001. Similarly, Fratzscher (2005), applying
a similar regression as Ito (2003) using daily data for the period 1990-2003, found that
Japanese interventions of ten billion dollars, which is approximately equal to one trillion
yen, moves the yen/dollar rate by 0.8 percent. Our much larger estimation result suggests
that these previous studies su⁄er from the endogeneity problem, so that the e⁄ectiveness of
interventions on the exchange rate was biased toward zero.14
Turning to the coe¢ cients in the policy reaction function, we ￿nd, ￿rst, that the coe¢ -
cient on the change in the exchange rate, ￿, is positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
indicating that a leaning-against-the-wind policy was adopted by the Japanese monetary
authorities during this sample period, and that they sold (purchased) about 53 billion yen
in a day in response to a one percent appreciation (depreciation) of the yen. Second, the
estimates of c1 and c2 are both positive, as predicted, and, more importantly, c2 is signi￿-
cantly larger than c1 in the sense that the 95 percent posterior intervals of c1 and c2 do not
overlap. Hence, the fact that interventions during the latter sample period were larger but
less frequent was due to the greater political costs. Third, the estimate of autocorrelation
between interventions, represented by ￿, is estimated to be positive, as expected, but not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in terms of the 95 percent interval; however, the probability
of it being below zero, Pr(< 0), is slightly less than 5 percent, indicating that it is most
likely positive and di⁄erent from zero.
Our MCMC approach gives us a posterior distribution for the auxiliary variable, It;h, for
each t and h. Figure 3 shows the estimate of this variable and the yen/dollar rate for each
hour on April 10, 1998, when the Japanese monetary authorities purchased 2.6 trillion yen,
14Kearns and Rigobon (2005), who identi￿ed the e⁄ects of intervention by making use of a structural
change in the policy reaction function, report that an intervention of one billion dollars moves the yen/dollar
rate by 1.5 percent, which is relatively close to our estimate, although it is still outside our 95 percent
posterior interval.
11the largest yen-buying intervention in our sample period. The solid line represents the mean
of the posterior distribution of It;h, while the dotted lines represent the 95 percent con￿dence
interval. We see that the estimated hourly amount of intervention is almost always positive
(i.e., almost all interventions are yen-buying interventions), and that it tends to be larger
when the yen is weaker, which is consistent with equation (7). However, the estimated hourly
amount takes the largest value, 0.5 trillion yen, at 6-7 am GMT (or 2-3 pm in Tokyo), and
this is exactly the time when the yen exhibits a sharp appreciation and records its highest
level on this day. This can be interpreted as aggressive yen-buying intervention during this
hour causing a sharp appreciation, which is consistent with equation (9). Put di⁄erently,
our MCMC approach does ￿data-augmentation￿for It;h so that the estimates of the hourly
amount of intervention become consistent both with equations (7) and (9), given intraday
￿ uctuations in the exchange rate.
Figure 4 shows the movement of the yen/dollar rate before and after the hour that a
yen-selling intervention is carried out. For the ￿gure, we collect the estimates of It;h for
148 business days when yen-selling interventions were reported to have been implemented.
We then identify h when the estimate of It;h is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the sense
that the 95% con￿dence interval of It;h does not include zero. Note that ￿ = 0 in the ￿gure
represents the hour of intervention and that the yen/dollar rates are divided by the levels at
the hour of intervention for normalization. The solid line represents the 50th percentile, or
median, of the distribution of the exchange rate, while the two dotted lines represent the 40th
and 60th percentiles, respectively. The ￿gure shows that there is a trend of yen appreciation
prior to the hour of intervention, indicating that the Japanese monetary authorities adopt
a leaning-against-the-wind policy in the sense that they sell yen and purchase dollars so as
to prevent the yen from appreciating further. It also shows that the value of the yen falls
very quickly in response to the intervention and stays there at least twelve hours after the
intervention. This indicates that interventions have a persistent e⁄ect on the level of the
yen/dollar rate, even though the e⁄ect on the change in the exchange rate is only temporary.
These results are all consistent with the estimated parameters reported in Table 2 and, more
importantly, can be seen as indirect evidence that the timing of intervention is correctly
estimated by our method.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the number of interventions per
day for the two subperiods.15 In the ￿gure, the horizontal axis represents the number of
15In Figure 5, we count the number of interventions signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the sense that the
95% posterior interval of It;h does not include zero.
12interventions (one-hour intervals in which an intervention, or interventions, occur) per day,
while the vertical axis shows the probability that this number, or a smaller number, of
interventions occur on a given day. The ￿gure shows that multiple interventions per day are
not a rare phenomenon at all; namely, the probability of two or more interventions per day
is 0.33 for the pre-1995 period, and 0.77 for the post-1995 period. The ￿gure also shows that
there exists a substantial di⁄erence between the two subperiods. On average, intervention
occurred 1.5 times a day during the pre-1995 period,16 while they occurred 3.3 times a day
during the post-1995 period.
Next, we decompose the yen-amount of intervention per business day into an extensive
margin (i.e., the probability of intervention for a given day) and an intensive margin (i.e.,
the yen-amount per intervention day) and compare these for the two subperiods. The results
are shown in Table 3.
As can be seen, the post-1995 period is characterized by a lower extensive margin and
a higher intensive margin; this con￿rms what we saw in Figure 2. But in addition, we can
conduct a similar decomposition at the hourly frequency using our estimate of It;h, and the
results are shown on the two rows from the bottom. The yen amount per intervention day
is decomposed into an extensive margin (the probability of interventions in a given hour
on a day that interventions were conducted) and an intensive margin (the yen-amount per
intervention hour).17 Interestingly, although part of the larger yen-amount per intervention
day comes from the larger extensive margin, it mostly derives from the larger intensive
margin. Interestingly, the larger yen-amount per intervention day in the post-1995 period
comes partly from the larger extensive margin, but mostly from the larger intensive margin.
It could therefore be said that the latter period is characterized by a higher intensive margin
not only at the daily frequency, but also at the hourly frequency.
4.4 Alternative speci￿cations of the policy reaction function
An important feature of our MCMC approach is that we make use of the knowledge about the
structure of the economy, which is represented by the equation for exchange rate dynamics
and the equation for policy reaction function. This implies that the performance of the entire
estimation process crucially depends on whether the structure of the economy is properly
speci￿ed or not. In this subsection we will check the sensitivity of the baseline results to
16This ￿gure is relatively close to Chang and Taylor￿ s (1998) ￿nding based on Reuters reports that the
Japanese central bank on average intervened 2.2 times a day in 1992-1993. See footnote 4.
17Note that the product of the two margins equals the yen amount per intervention day divided by 24.
13various changes in the speci￿cation of the policy reaction function.
4.4.1 Higher political costs at night
One possible factor determining the reaction function is that political costs are higher at
night. Neely (2001) presents survey results from central banks about various issues related
to foreign exchange intervention. Among the questions he included is one that asked at
what times of the day interventions were conducted. He provided the following options:
￿prior to normal business hours,￿￿morning of the business days,￿￿afternoon of the business
day,￿and ￿after normal business hours.￿One of the interesting features we learn from the
responses to this question is that about 56 percent of central banks answered that they never
intervene ￿prior to normal business hours,￿and similarly about 35 percent answered that
they never intervene ￿after normal business hours.￿Yet, it is possible that the intervention
strategy of the Japan￿ s monetary authorities are quite di⁄erent from that of other monetary
authorities because of Japan￿ s geographical location. However, various pieces of anecdotal
evidence regarding the intervention behavior of Japan￿ s monetary authorities suggest that
they are active during hours in which the Tokyo market is open, while they are much less
active during other hours, which is more or less similar to what Neely￿ s (2001) survey results
indicate.
The fact that central banks seldom intervene during night hours may be interpreted as
re￿ ecting that the political costs are higher at night than during the daytime, so that central
banks hesitate to intervene at night even if the optimal level of intervention is not zero. If
this is the case, our assumption regarding political costs may be inappropriate. That is, in
the previous subsection we assumed that the Japanese monetary authorities incur political
costs at the beginning of a day, and once such costs have been incurred at that time, they
are allowed to intervene at any time of that day, including night time, without incurring any
additional political costs. An alternative speci￿cation would be that the Japanese monetary
authorities incur additional political costs, which are very high (probably prohibitively high),
when they intervene at night.
Based on this line of reasoning, we assume that It;h is equal to zero at night (h = 9;:::;24,
or between 6 pm and 9 am Tokyo time). Speci￿cally, we replace equation (8) by:
It;h =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1(jI￿
t;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c1)I￿
t;h for h = 1;:::;8; and t < TB
1(jI￿
t;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c2)I￿
t;h for h = 1;:::;8; and t ￿ TB
0 for h = 9;:::;24
(10)
14and repeat the same exercise as before. The regression result is presented in Table 4, showing
that the baseline result obtained earlier is not sensitive to this change in the policy reaction
function. The coe¢ cient associated with the e⁄ectiveness of intervention, ￿, is negative and
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, as before, although it is now a little smaller, indicating
that an intervention of one trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 1.17 percent. Second,
the coe¢ cient on the change in the exchange rate in the policy reaction function, ￿, is
positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, indicating again that the Japanese monetary
authorities adopt a leaning-against-the-wind policy. Third, the coe¢ cients related to the
size of the political costs, c1 and c2, are both positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
as before, and the political costs are signi￿cantly larger in the latter sample period.
4.4.2 Alternative forms of the optimal intervention function
Next, we consider alternative forms of the optimal intervention function. Equation (7),
which is basically identical to the intervention function adopted by Kearns and Rigobon
(2005), may be too simple to capture details of Japanese intervention policy. Ito and Yabu
(2007) propose a policy reaction function that can be regarded as a better approximation
to the Japanese policy reaction function. Speci￿cally, they assume that the optimal amount
of intervention depends on the deviation of the actual exchange rate from its target level,
which is determined by the weighted average of st￿1;h￿1, st￿21;h￿1, and sMA
t￿1;h￿1, where sMA
t;h
is de￿ned as the moving average of the exchange rate over the last one year. To incorporate
this idea into our model, we replace equation (7) by:
I
￿
t;h = ￿I + ￿1(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1) + ￿2(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿21;h￿1) + ￿3(st;h￿1 ￿ s
MA
t;h￿1) + ￿It￿1 + ￿t;h (11)
Note that equation (7) is a special case of the above equation with both of ￿2 and ￿3 being
equal to zero.
We conduct the same exercise as before and the results are presented in Table 5. We
con￿rm two features of the baseline results: the coe¢ cient associated with the e⁄ectiveness
of intervention, ￿, is negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero; the coe¢ cients related to
political costs, c1 and c2, are both positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Turning to
the new coe¢ cients in the policy reaction function, ￿1 and ￿2 are both positive as before,
but ￿3 is almost zero, indicating the Japanese monetary authorities take a leaning-against-
the-wind posture with respect to changes in the exchange rate at the daily and monthly
frequency, but not at the annual frequency.18
18Ito (2003) estimates a policy reaction function that is similar to equation (11), but with simple OLS,
155 Conclusion
Estimating the e⁄ects of foreign exchange interventions is not an easy task because the
central bank reacts even to intraday changes in the exchange rate, while intervention data
at best is available at the daily frequency. In this paper, we therefore proposed a new
methodology based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation to cope with this endogeneity
problem. We ￿rst conduct ￿imputation￿or ￿data augmentation￿to obtain intraday amounts
of intervention and then estimate the e¢ cacy of interventions using the augmented data.
Applying this method to Japanese intervention data, we found that an intervention of one
trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 1.7 percent, which is more than twice as large as the
magnitude reported in previous studies applying OLS to daily observations. We interpreted
this di⁄erence as highlighting the quantitative importance of the endogeneity problem due to
temporal aggregation. Some previous studies pursued the idea of augmenting the observed
low-frequency data with simulated high-frequency data, especially in the area of ￿nance, but
this paper is the ￿rst attempt to apply this idea in addressing the endogeneity problem.
Our method should work well in an environment in which the true structure of the econ-
omy, including the policy reaction function, is well known to researchers. Our empirical
analysis demonstrated that this is indeed the case for Japanese foreign exchange interven-
tions. However, given that not much research has been conducted on the intraday behavior
of the monetary authorities, our knowledge about this is still limited. Speci￿cally, in our
empirical section, we needed to make guesses regarding the form of the reaction function at
the hourly frequency, assuming that this was similar to the reaction function at the daily
frequency, which has been extensively investigated in previous studies. However, it cannot
be ruled out that monetary authorities behave di⁄erently depending on the time frame (i.e.,
interday or intraday). It is our future task to accumulate knowledge about this.
and obtains ￿1 = 1:0422; ￿2 = 0:1369; ￿3 = 0:0632.
16A Estimation procedure of the model with political costs
The methodology for estimating the model without political costs given by equations (1)
and (2) is presented in Section 2.2. The purpose of this appendix is to provide details
regarding the estimation of the model with political costs represented by equations (6) and
(7). The parameters to be estimated are ￿s, ￿, ￿I, ￿, c1, c2, ￿2
￿, and ￿2
￿. In addition to these
parameters, we estimate auxiliary variables, It;h and I￿
t;h, for each h and t. A ￿ at prior is
adopted for ￿s, ￿, ￿I, ￿, c1, and c2. As for ￿2
￿ and ￿2
￿, priors are the same as those used in
Section 3.
The posterior conditional distributions, which are needed to implement Gibbs Sampling,
are obtained from the priors and the assumptions of the data generating process. The
following steps 1 through 6 are iterated to obtain joint and marginal distributions of the
parameters and the auxiliary variables.
Step 1 Generate ￿s and ￿ conditional on st;h, It;h, and ￿2
￿. We have the regression st;h ￿
st;h￿1 = ￿s + ￿It;h + ￿t;h. Hence, the posterior distribution is (￿s;￿)
0 ￿ N(￿s;!s)




sYs and !s = (X
0
sXs)￿1￿2
￿ with the matrices Xs = f1;It;hg and
Ys = fst;h ￿ st;h￿1g.
Step 2 Generate ￿2







where ￿s = ￿1 + T and ￿s = ￿1 + RSSs with RSSs =
P
(st;h ￿ st;h￿1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿It;h)2.
Step 3 Generate ￿I and ￿ conditional on st;h, I￿
t;h, and ￿2
￿. We have the regression I￿
t;h = ￿I+
￿(st;h￿1￿st￿1;h￿1)+￿t;h. Hence, the posterior distribution is (￿I;￿)





IYI and !I = (X
0
IXI)￿1￿2
￿ with the matrices XI = f1;st;h￿1￿st￿1;h￿1g
and YI = fI￿
t;hg.
Step 4 Generate ￿2
￿ conditional on st;h, I￿











Step 5 Generate It;h and I￿
t;h conditional on st;h, It, ￿s, ￿, ￿I, ￿, c1, c2, ￿2
￿, and ￿2
￿. Consider





where ￿t = (￿t;1;:::;￿t;24)0 and ￿ = diag(’;:::;’) with ￿t;h = 1
￿2
￿(￿I + ￿(st;h￿1 ￿
st￿1;h￿1)) + ￿2
￿2




￿)￿1. Hence, the posterior distri-







t = B￿t and ￿￿ = B￿B0 with B de￿ned by (5). We can partition the matrices
￿￿






















t;1 is 23 ￿ 1, ￿￿
t;2 is 1 ￿ 1, ￿￿
11 is 23 ￿ 23, ￿￿
12 is 1 ￿ 1, ￿￿
21 is 1 ￿ 1, and ￿￿
22 is






b ￿; ^ ￿
￿








21. We can partition







5, ^ ￿ =
2
4
^ ￿11 ^ ￿21
^ ￿12 ^ ￿22
3
5
where b ￿t;1 is 1 ￿ 1, b ￿t;2 is 22 ￿ 1, ^ ￿11 is 1 ￿ 1, ^ ￿12 is 1 ￿ 22, ^ ￿21 is 22 ￿ 1, and ￿￿
22 is
22￿22. Then the posterior distribution of It;1 conditional on It is It;1j It ￿ N(b ￿t;1; ^ ￿11).
The posterior distribution of (It;2;:::;It;23)





b ￿t;2 + ^ ￿21(^ ￿11)




Since we have the political costs, It;h and I￿
t;h are generated from the following:
t 2 f It 6= 0; t < TBg : Generate It;1 from a truncated normal distribution such as
N(b ￿t;1; ^ ￿11) conditional on jIt;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c1. Then generate (It;2;:::;It;23)
0 from
(12) and construct It;24 = It ￿
P23
h=1 It;h. Set I￿
t;h = It;h for h = 1;:::;24.
t 2 fIt = 0; t < TBg : Generate I￿
t;1 from a truncated normal distribution such as
N(￿I + ￿1(st￿1;24 ￿ st￿2;24);￿2
￿) conditional on jI￿
t;1 ￿ ￿Ij < c1. Then generate
I￿
t;h from N(￿I + ￿1(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1);￿2
￿) for h = 2;:::;24. Set It;h = 0 for
h = 1;:::;24.
t 2 fIt 6= 0; t ￿ TBg : Generate It;1 from a truncated normal distribution such as
N(b ￿t;1; ^ ￿) conditional on jIt;1 ￿ ￿Ij > c2. Then generate (It;2;:::;It;23)
0 from
(12) and construct It;24 = It ￿
P23
h=1 It;i. Set I￿
t;h = It;h for h = 1;:::;24.
18t 2 fIt = 0; t ￿ TBg : Generate I￿
t;1 from a truncated normal distribution such as
N(￿I + ￿1(st￿1;24 ￿ st￿2;24);￿2
￿) conditional on jI￿
t;1 ￿ ￿Ij < c2. Then, gener-
ate I￿
t;h from N(￿I + ￿1(st;h￿1 ￿ st￿1;h￿1);￿2
￿) for h = 2;:::;24. Set It;h = 0 for
h = 1;:::;24.
Step 6 Generate c1 and c2 conditional on ￿s, ￿, ￿I, ￿, ￿2
￿, and ￿2
￿. De￿ne the cumulative











t (c1 + ￿I) ￿ ￿
It=0




t (c1 + ￿I) + ￿
It6=0
t (￿c1 + ￿I)
i1(It6=0)
.





t (c2 + ￿I) ￿ ￿
It=0




t (c2 + ￿I) + ￿
It6=0
t (￿c2 + ￿I)
i1(It6=0)
.
These densities are intractable and hence we implement the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm to draw from them.
We iterate steps 1 through 6 M + N times and discard the realizations of the ￿rst M
iterations but keep the last N iterations to form a random sample of size N on which
statistical inference can be made. We set M = 10;000 and N = 10;000.
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22Table 1: Finite Sample Properties of the Three Estimators








T = 100 ￿ 0.0000 0.0013 0.0237 0.0238 -0.0001 0.0018
￿ -0.0029 0.0602 -0.1036 0.1352 0.0039 0.0859
T = 250 ￿ -0.0000 0.0009 0.0237 0.0237 0.0000 0.0012
￿ 0.0008 0.0387 -0.1005 0.1158 0.0075 0.0569
T = 500 ￿ -0.0001 0.0006 0.0238 0.0238 0.0001 0.0008
￿ -0.0018 0.0274 -0.1044 0.1115 0.0034 0.0401
Note: ￿Bias￿is de￿ned to be the deviation of each estimator from the true value. For example, the bias
associated with ￿ is equal to the mean of estimators of ￿ over 500 replications minus its true value, namely
-0.015. ￿
p
MSE￿represents the root mean squared error for each estimator. We estimate 3 chains from
independent starting points in each replication. Each chain runs 4000 draws and the ￿rst 2000 are discarded
as the burn-in-phase.
23Table 2: Baseline Results
Without lagged intervention term With lagged intervention term
Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R
Equation for exchange rate dynamics
￿ -0.0174 0.0008 1.0000 1.063 -0.0176 0.0008 1.0000 1.017
[-0.0189, -0.0158] [-0.0192, -0.0162]
Equation for policy reaction function
￿ 0.2253 0.0740 0.0011 1.003 0.2134 0.0713 0.0010 1.001
[0.0828, 0.3743] [0.0751, 0.3546]
￿ 0.0140 0.0084 0.0498 1.000
[-0.0026, 0.0306]
c1 0.1023 0.0053 0.0000 1.058 0.1011 0.0047 0.0000 1.018
[0.0929, 0.1136] [0.0918, 0.1100]
c2 0.1697 0.0085 0.0000 1.067 0.1679 0.0080 0.0000 1.016
[0.1546, 0.1881] [0.1526, 0.1838]
Note: Constants are estimated but not reported. The columns labeled ￿Mean￿and ￿Std. Dev.￿refer to
the mean and standard deviation of the marginal distribution of a parameter. The columns labeled ￿Pr(< 0)￿
refer to the frequency of ￿nding negative values. The columns labeled ^ R refer to the Gelman-Rubin statistic
to monitor the convergence of the Markov chains. ^ R < 1:1 is considered as a sign of convergence. The values
in the brackets are the 95 percent posterior bands of the parameter. We estimate 5 chains from independent
starting points. Each chain runs 20;000 draws and the ￿rst half is discarded as the burn-in-phase.
24Table 3: Intensive and Extensive Margins of Japanese Interventions
1991-2002 1991-1995 (A) 1995-2002 (B) B/A
Yen-amount per business day [trillion] 0.010 0.007 0.012 1.84
Probability of intervention day 0.070 0.149 0.025 0.16
Yen-amount per intervention day [trillion] 0.155 0.047 0.519 11.06
Probability of intervention hour 0.079 0.061 0.138 2.25
Yen-amount per intervention hour [trillion] 0.081 0.032 0.156 4.89
Note: ￿Yen-amount of intervention per business day￿is de￿ned as the total amount of intervention during
the observation period divided by the number of business days. ￿Probability of intervention day￿is de￿ned
as the number of intervention days divided by the number of business days. ￿Yen-amount per intervention
day￿is de￿ned as the total amount of intervention during the observation period divided by the number of
intervention days. ￿Probability of intervention hour￿is de￿ned as the number of intervention hours divided
by the number of intervention days multiplied by 24. ￿Yen-amount per intervention hour￿is de￿ned as the
total amount of intervention during the observation period divided by the number of intervention hours.
25Table 4: Intervention Only in the Tokyo Market
Without lagged intervention With lagged intervention
Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R
Equation for exchange rate dynamics
￿ -0.0117 0.0005 1.0000 1.034 -0.0117 0.0005 1.0000 1.017
[-0.0127, -0.0107] [-0.0127, -0.0107]
Equation for policy reaction function
￿ 0.5251 0.1799 0.0019 1.004 0.5205 0.1828 0.0021 1.004
[0.1707, 0.8797] [0.1584, 0.8708]
￿ 0.0422 0.0211 0.0247 1.002
[0.0001, 0.0827]
c1 0.1491 0.0070 0.0000 1.045 0.1499 0.0073 0.0000 1.017
[0.1361, 0.1638] [0.1365, 0.1651]
c2 0.2526 0.0113 0.0000 1.043 0.2541 0.0118 0.0000 1.020
[0.2327, 0.2764] [0.2326, 0.2786]
Note: Constants are estimated but not reported. The columns labeled ￿Mean￿and ￿Std. Dev.￿refer to
the mean and standard deviation of the marginal distribution of a parameter. The columns labeled ￿Pr(< 0)￿
refer to the frequency of ￿nding negative values. The columns labeled ^ R refer to the Gelman-Rubin statistic
to monitor the convergence of the Markov chains. ^ R < 1:1 is considered as a sign of convergence. The values
in the brackets are the 95 percent posterior bands of the parameter. We estimate 5 chains from independent
starting points. Each chain runs 20;000 draws and the ￿rst half is discarded as the burn-in-phase.
26Table 5: Alternative Speci￿cation of Optimal Intervention Function
Without lagged intervention With lagged intervention
Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R Mean Std. Dev. Pr(< 0) ^ R
Equation for exchange rate dynamics
￿ -0.0175 0.0008 1.0000 1.059 -0.0174 0.0008 1.0000 1.029
[-0.0190, -0.0159] [-0.0188, -0.0159]
Equation for policy reaction function
￿1 0.1494 0.0858 0.0400 1.002 0.1572 0.0863 0.0333 1.004
[-0.0178, 0.3197] [-0.0106, 0.3274]
￿2 0.0757 0.0544 0.0823 1.003 0.0690 0.0548 0.1041 1.003
[-0.0295, 0.1819] [-0.0356, 0.1766]
￿3 -0.0038 0.0236 0.5639 1.005 -0.0057 0.0229 0.5975 1.002
[-0.0499, 0.0432] [-0.0510, 0.0388]
￿ 0.0128 0.0086 0.0689 1.001
[-0.0041, 0.0297]
c1 0.1017 0.0053 0.0000 1.054 0.1027 0.0051 0.0000 1.028
[0.0920, 0.1125] [0.0933, 0.1132]
c2 0.1689 0.0083 0.0000 1.057 0.1704 0.0081 0.0000 1.025
[0.1538, 0.1865] [0.1556, 0.1870]
Note: Constants are estimated but not reported. The columns labeled ￿Mean￿and ￿Std. Dev.￿refer to
the mean and standard deviation of the marginal distribution of a parameter. The columns labeled ￿Pr(< 0)￿
refer to the frequency of ￿nding negative values. The columns labeled ^ R refer to the Gelman-Rubin statistic
to monitor the convergence of the Markov chains. ^ R < 1:1 is considered as a sign of convergence. The values
in the brackets are the 95 percent posterior bands of the parameter. We estimate 5 chains from independent
starting points. Each chain runs 20;000 draws and the ￿rst half is discarded as the burn-in-phase.
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Number of interventions per day 
Figure 5: Frequency of interventions per day
Before June 1995 After June 1995